

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 10

PSB D-14c/2
March 5, 1953

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington, D. C.

THIRD REPORT

TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION OF

PSB D-14c

"PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN
FOR THE REDUCTION OF COM-
MUNIST POWER IN FRANCE".

Submitted by the LENAP Committee

Homer Byington (State)

William Godel (Defense)

[Redacted Box]

Charles R. Norberg (PSB)
(Chairman)

25X1

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

MORI

87214

Security Information
TOP SECRET

P&B D - 14c/2
March 5, 1953

I. BACKGROUND OF LENAP PAPERS

A. Preliminary Examination of Problem

1. On July 9, 1951, representatives of the Department of State, of Defense, ECA, and CIA met with Mr. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, and with Mr. Gordon Gray, Director, Psychological Strategy Board, in Mr. Harriman's office. The purpose of the meeting was to consider the implications for the defense of Western Europe, of the continuing power of the Communist parties in France and Italy, as evidenced by their popular vote in the 1951 Italian municipal elections and the French elections for the Chamber of Deputies.

2. At this meeting consideration was given to memoranda prepared in the Department of State and by Mr. Samuel D. Berger of Mr. Harriman's office, analyzing these recent elections. It was generally agreed that the results of these elections had been disappointing. While the electoral mechanisms had been manipulated so as greatly to reduce communist representation in the French Chamber and in Italian municipalities, nonetheless the communist parties in 1951 had shown a voting strength, roughly equal, in the case of Italy, to that of the previous elections of 1948 and, in the case of France, reduced only by about 9 percent over the elections of 1946. It was conceded that despite the economic improvements which had been realized in France and Italy as a result of American aid and the ECA program -- which may well have saved these countries from communist control -- economic aid alone and even improvement in the standard of living was by no means an adequate answer to the internal threat. It was felt therefore that consideration should be given to new techniques to deprive the French and Italian Communists of their power, recognizing that these parties constituted a continuing threat to democratic government and even to the security of the NATO forces in Western Europe.

25X1A

87214

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D - 14c/2
March 5, 1953

3. The general conclusions reached at the above meeting resulted in the following actions:

a. Despatch by the Department of State of cables to the Embassies in Paris and Rome on 12 July 1951, in which it was noted that the U. S. Government should give consideration to taking steps with the Italian and French Governments so that they would attempt a more aggressive role in undertaking determined action against the material sources of communist power.

b. Conferences with the Ambassadors in Paris and Rome and with Ambassador Katz and other ECA representatives undertaken by Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director of CIA, to consider:

(a) Specific actions which the French and Italian Governments might take administratively or through legislation to deprive the communist parties of their material resources and reduce their power, particularly in the labor movements; (b) How the United States can best proceed in bringing the respective governments to initiate such action, and (c) How the various United States agencies, once such steps are initiated by the governments, could best lend support to such policies of the governments and to their day by day action in carrying out anti-communist measures.

4. Mr. Dulles' conclusions were developed in a memorandum entitled "Analysis of the power of the Communist Parties in France and Italy and of measures to counter them", dated September 15, 1951, for the Director of CIA and the Chairman of the Psychological Strategy Board, in which he stated that: "...it should be a major point of American and of NATO policy to cripple these Communist Parties, to uncover their true intentions, to sow discord in their ranks and promote defection, to deprive them of privilege and respectability, and to drive them underground" and that "a stepped up program of

87214

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D - 14c/2
March 5, 1953

action might well be considered by the Psychological Strategy Board in consultation with State, Defense, ECA and CIA, and then coordinated with our Embassies in Paris and Rome."

5. Mr. Dulles' memo was reviewed by the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board and his staff; and a determination was made that the psychological actions proposed in subject report were immediately feasible, potentially profitable and susceptible of direction toward an area of relatively high priority for the application of psychological strategy. Terms of Reference were prepared to insure that the project was an action program, that plans for subsidiary actions would develop in the implementing departments and agencies and referred to PSB for review and information, and that action priorities were established in the basic plan to insure coordinated planning. At the PSB meeting on September 27, 1951, the Terms of Reference were approved and a planning panel was established. The task of the panel was to analyze the Dulles Report, to proceed with consideration of the feasibility of the several programs for France and Italy recommended therein, and to develop additional programs for the same purposes.

6. The exploration of this problem constituted a relatively new field for U. S. policy makers since it dealt with U. S. activities aimed at influencing the internal affairs of another sovereign state. Hence the development of the plans constituted unique advances in U. S. psychological effort, insofar as they authorized the U. S. agencies to foster and initiate activities within the two countries to reduce communist political prestige and to wean political support away from local communist parties. In providing that the French and Italian workers should be separated from communist-dominated unions, and that French and Italian business men be influenced to deal with non-communist unions, the plans likewise ventured upon new terrain insofar as government policy was concerned.

Security Information
TOP SECRET

87214

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D - 14c/2

March 5, 1953

B. Preliminary Measures for Implementation

7. Soon after the approval of PSB D-14c by the Psychological Strategy Board on February 21, 1952, committees were established in both Washington and Paris for the purpose of coordinating the implementation of the plan. Since that time, there has been an interchange of views between members of the committees, both by personal visits and by exchange of progress reports and other pertinent papers.*

8. Functioning of the Paris committee is the direct responsibility of our Ambassador and, in addition to interdepartmental representatives, discussions are now participated in by the Chief of the MSA Mission to France and the Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris Embassy. Pursuant to a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a representative of the United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe, has been authorized to soon participate in the discussions as requested by the Ambassador.

9. The Paris committee had indicated that the present form of coordination is adequate, namely periodic written reviews and reports on the part of Paris and Washington and informal exchanges of views between both as opportunities arise. We are in agreement that it would be advisable to establish informal coordination between the Rome and Paris committees in the form of periodic exchanges of views whenever occasions permit.

* The Washington Committee has submitted to the Director, PSB, two progress reports with regard to the implementation of the plan; one report was submitted on May 8, 1952 and the second report was submitted on 7 August 1952. Copies of these progress reports were forwarded to the Paris coordinating committee for their comment and information.

Security Information
TOP SECRET

Page 4 of 25

87214

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-14c/2
March 5, 1953

II. CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF PSB D-14c

A. Comments

10. The Paris Committee has studied and discussed PSB D-14c at considerable length and the members are basically in accord with the aims of the program. However, in the light of the current situation in France, it is their view that the paper seems more appropriate as a check list for actions which may or may not be practical at the moment for the French Government to undertake rather than as a blueprint for specific actions to be carried out at any given time by another government. With regard to this, the Washington committee feels it appropriate to refer to the resolution adopted by the Psychological Strategy Board on February 21, 1952 which was made an integral part of PSB D-14c. That resolution recites the Board's position and reads in part as follows:

"First, that the continued strength of the Communist movement in France is a source of continued concern to the United States, which must be made clear to the French Government at every appropriate opportunity; second, that the United States will make a determined effort to reduce this strength through the courses of action set forth in PSB D-14c; and third, that it is extremely desirable that French intentions in this connection be ascertained."

11. We are in agreement that the delicacy of the plan cannot be over-emphasized. It is noted that the Paris Committee feels that in the process of reasserting herself, France has become acutely jealous of her sovereignty and desirous of limiting United States interference in her affairs; that the present French Government is fully conscious of the dangers to France represented in the Communist Party; that the French

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

87214

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D-14c/2
March 5, 1953

Government is currently proceeding to deal vigorously with the problem and in consequence it behooves the United States to keep discreetly in the background. Since the advent of the Mayer Government, it has appeared that it probably will be as actively anti-communist as its predecessor. The former Ministers of Justice, Interior and Defense have been retained; Mayer himself has a strong anti-communist record; and the Gaullists are now cooperating with the Government. The Pinay campaign may even be intensified.

12. With regard to the present strength of the Communist Party, the estimate contained in PSB D-14c is amended to reflect the fact that the Party membership is now estimated as somewhat below 500,000. The Party has apparently lost 50,000 card bearing members since June 1952 and a recent informed estimate places the loss as high as 100,000. It is also noted that Party strength has been affected adversely by the government's action against it, as well as by the internal dissensions that have arisen over the Marty-Tillon and Guingouin incidents.

13. With regard to sources of strength of the Communist Party, the analysis of the sources of communist strength made in Section B of Paris Embassy Despatch No. 2950 of May 8, 1952 is referred to and incorporated herein by reference. We are in agreement that in drawing up any program of anti-communist action, the sources of communist strength should constantly be borne in mind and that such action to be effective must be aimed at each of these sources individually.

14. Concerning the capabilities of the Party, it is noted that the Party's major effect in wartime is its potential for disrupting, and in some cases paralyzing, communications and power facilities through the sabotage action of its technical experts placed in strategic positions. The present

Security Information
TOP SECRET

Page 6 of 25

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-14c/2
March 5, 1953

capabilities of the para-military force of the Party for conducting guerrilla activity are not considered particularly great. It is believed that barring a situation of panic produced by an actual Soviet invasion, the Government would succeed in smashing attempts at guerrilla activity on the part of any communist para-military force. Assuming that the Party is capable of carrying out some para-military harassment, it is believed that so long as France is not invaded, the government would be capable of preventing serious guerrilla activity in wartime.

15. With reference to Paragraph 8 of PSB D-14c, referring to the widespread disillusion of French workers with their government, their employer's attitudes, and even with their own trade unions, it is noted that the price stabilization that the French Government has achieved over the past 8 months and the accompanying restoration of confidence in the French economy has considerably qualified, for the time being, the arguments advanced for communist exploitation of economic and social discontent. Such discontent is no longer widespread and the former Pinay Government had enjoyed far more confidence than any other in recent years.

16. Concerning the vulnerabilities of the Communist Party as referred to in Paragraph 9 of D-14c, it is noted that at present no individual may be legally removed from any post in the public service or national economy by virtue of Communist Party membership. It has, however, been accepted practice for sometime to transfer such persons to non-sensitive positions by administrative action and the government is now considering a bill to permit the direct removal of communist from government positions.

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-14c/2
March 5, 1953

B. Additions

17. The following addition to the terms of PSB D-14c is hereby affected:

"Add to Group B, Paragraph B, 3(c): "Discretely encourage
and guide the explanation and rationalization of United
States East-West Trade policy to the French."

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

Page 8 of 25

Security Information
TOP SECRET

FSB D -14c/2
March 5, 1953⁹⁵⁵

III. PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTATION

A. Current Anti-Communist Action in France

18. Over the past several months, great progress has been made along the lines envisaged by FSB D-14c. Indications are that the Mayer Government will be sympathetic to these objectives. The Pinay Government had succeeded in effectively striking at some of the major sources of Communist Party strength through two sets of legal proceedings against the communists and through a concurrently and closely connected campaign to discredit the national loyalty of the Party. In addition, it had begun to dissipate fear as a source of Communist Party strength and had laid the basis for more effective and extensive action against the Party and its network of organizations than has heretofore taken place.

19. The first set of legal proceedings is concerned with a plot against the internal security of the State and is instituted against a hundred or so of the communist "small-fry" who participated in the May 28 demonstrations. The second set of legal proceedings is of exceptional importance and involves charges of plotting against the external security of the State. Involved are the Party's Acting Secretary General and four other politburo members, as well as the Secretary General of the CGT and the leaders of the UJRF. The Assembly has been asked to waive the parliamentary immunity of the Party leaders in question in order that they may be tried by military court for directing an enterprise to demoralize the army and the nation.

20. To secure all possible evidence in recent months the government has conducted three nation-wide raids on Party and front headquarters. As a result of these and similar actions, the Party and its fronts now find themselves placed on the defensive to such an extent that they have had wholly to renounce the violent tactics on which they had embarked late last spring.

Security Information
TOP SECRETPSB D - 14c/2
March 5, 1953

21. In addition to conducting a campaign to dissipate the national loyalty of the Party, the government has partially dissipated the element of fear as another source of Party strength internally by handling of the May riots and externally by the build-up of Western defense capabilities through NATO. Further, as part of a program for more positive and extensive action in the future, a bill is now under consideration by the Cabinet which would eliminate communists from government posts. If the government wins its case against the communist leaders, it will be possible for it to get enacted a very effective bill and it will open the door to more far-reaching measures for reducing communist strength in France.

22. Certain cautions, however, are to be noted particularly with the resignation of the Pinay Government and until we have a full realization of future prospects of strong anti-communist action by the Mayer Government. Concurrently, there is always the danger that the economic situation may not continue to improve. Further, the government's evidence against the Communist Party may not be as solid as our Embassy has been assured in confidence that it is. Also a refusal by the Assembly to lift the immunity of the CP leaders may serve to discourage the government. Nevertheless, the present anti-communist climate is the best since the war and the measures currently being taken against the communists will in all probability, if pushed through to completion of even their present phases by the Mayer Government, have lasting beneficial effect in weakening communist strength in France.

B. Notes on Specific Actions Proposed by PSB D-14c

23. PSB D-14c proposed certain specific actions for general implementation with the purpose of reducing communist strength and influence in France. These actions have been reviewed by the Paris Embassy with notes of progress which have been effected and the prospects for future accomplishment of our objectives. Comments of the Paris Embassy are attached hereto as Annex A.

Security Information
TOP SECRET

Page 10 of 25

Security Information
TOP SECRET

FSB D -14c/2
March 5, 1953

IV. FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION

A. Actions by the French Government

24. With regard to priorities for implementing the specific courses of action suggested in FSB D-14c, bearing in mind the observations of the Paris panel, together with the realization that suggested courses of action are not mutually exclusive and progress should be made on all fronts insofar as possible, it is felt that a general priority should be established for those courses of action in the trade union field as outlined in Section V, Part II, A, 1., of the plan.

25. The importance of communist influence over labor is fully appreciated both by the Paris and Washington committees. It is noted that action by the French Government in this field has been impeded by (1) the small degree of unionization of French labor, and (2) the strength of the force dividing it. It is further appreciated that success of the government's present campaign against the communist leaders, and particularly against the CGT's Secretary General Leap may well permit stronger action to be taken to weaken CGT influence. It is in the light of this critical situation that every effort should be made which, in the judgment of the Embassy, can be effectively made at the present time to cause French Government action to be successful in reducing the strength of the communists in the trade union field.

26. Although the CGT has gradually declined in membership over a considerable period of time, it nevertheless, remains by far the largest organized labor force, and its overall control of the labor field is still the dominating influence in the French trade union field. It still has a considerable hold on both official and unofficial machinery in the labor field, a hold which was grabbed during the immediate post-war period and has never

Security Information
TOP SECRET

87214

Security InformationTOP SECRET

PSB D-14c/2

March 5, 1953

been relinquished. On the other hand, it is sufficient to refer to the recent FO congress to see the divisions existing in the non-communist labor movement. Neither the FO, the CFTC, nor the independents are united, and it is apparent that none of them at this time is making much progress in cutting down the strength of the CGT, nor in attaining the degree of cooperation required for any semblance of an united anti-communist labor front. In this regard, it is important to emphasize the desirability of a direct attack on the CGT; in particular to strengthen the anti-communist forces already existent within it and which have in the past refused to support CGT actions when they have been essentially for a political purpose. Therefore, in complete awareness of the notes of the Embassy with regard to the suggested actions, it is concluded that a general priority for those projects related to the trade union field is justified.

27. As a secondary priority, there is agreement that those actions outlined in Section V, Part II, A, 2., "In the field of Government, including Legislative and Administrative" offer a most fertile field among the proposals for action by the French Government. Accordingly, this is a vital sphere in which to encourage certain general and specific efforts and it is understood that, in so doing, we should not spoil the present picture of the campaign as the result of French initiative.

28. It is felt that particularly in view of the accession to power of a new government, it is desirable to make clear to the French Government our continuing concern with the strength of the communist movement in France. It is suggested, therefore, that the Embassy continue to utilize any appropriate opportunity of approaching the French Government with a view to encouraging implementation of the plan.

29. In the field of national defense, it is understood that the paramount considerations for both the French Government and the United States Government will always be military rather than anti-communist. In addition,

Security InformationTOP SECRET

Page 12 of 25 Pages

Security InformationTOP SECRET

PSB D-14c/2

March 5, 1953

with regard to Part III, Group B, there is agreement that a great need exists in France for social reforms, rationalization of the economy, etc., in order to strike out the social and economic basis for communist attack. Every effort should continue to be made to encourage industrial productivity, improvement in labor management relations and enactment of a more equitable tax structure. It is understood, however, that French military preparedness is still our primary goal today and that many social aims must perforce be deferred.

B. Actions by the United States Government

30. It is concluded that as a matter of general priority, the United States Government should take all feasible action to accomplish the objectives outlined in Section V, Part II, B, 1., "In the trade union field". Thus, a parallel effort along the same general priority lines will be conducted by both the United States and the French Governments.

31. As a matter of secondary priority, it is considered that it is desirable to pursue the objectives outlined in Section V, Part II, B, 3., "In the Field of Public Opinion". It is clear that every effort should be made to carry out our information program as subtly and discreetly as possible. Every attempt should be made to eliminate or mitigate the impression of the size of the American information program and organization in France and to concentrate on cooperative efforts with the French, such as the Paix et Liberte and non-attributable activities rather than increase the dissemination of propaganda and informational materials under official American auspices.

Security InformationTOP SECRET

Page 13 of 25 Pages

87214

Security Information
TOP SECRET

PSB D - 14c/2
March 5, 1953

32. As appropriate, active consideration should be given to the accomplishment of all suggested activities outlined under Part III, Group B, B, "Activities by the United States Government". While considerable United States Government action has already been taken within the general frame of reference outlined by these suggested actions, there nevertheless remains a great deal of work to be accomplished. It would seem most appropriate for the Washington committee to have prepared detailed comments and proposals for the purpose of implementing the objectives set forth in this section of the plan.

Security Information
TOP SECRET

Page 14 of 25

87214

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-14c/2

March 5, 1953

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

33. The French Communist Party continued throughout 1952 to contract in size and to display the same lack of dynamism that has characterized it to an ever increasing extent during the past four years. Membership in the Party is now estimated at around 450,000, amounting to a 50 percent decline in over-all membership since 1946. The electoral strength of the communists, however, continues to run at about 5,000,000 out of a total of 19,000,000 votes cast in all postwar national elections.

34. At no time during 1952 did the Party reveal any capacity for rallying non-communist support to such an extent as to influence government policy. Signs of a split in the Party hierarchy became evident with the purge of Marty and Tillon and in September the Party line became a "United National Front" policy. The French Communists are apparently striving to create a united front with all elements of the population on the basis of a program of "peace, national independence, and democratic liberties".

35. In spite of its decline in 1952, the French Communist apparatus will remain for the foreseeable future a powerful and dangerous factor for French security and therefore for our own within the NATO framework. The CPF is one of the World's largest Communist parties outside the Soviet Bloc. In France, itself, it is still a major political party, an important power in the trade union movement, and a huge propaganda machine.

36. After nearly a year of preliminary activity organizational measures for the full implementation of PSB D-14c, "Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in France", are close to crystallization. Committees are currently functioning in Paris and Washington on a regular basis and it is anticipated that future consideration by these committees of proposed specific activities to be carried out

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

PSB D-14c/2

March 5, 1953

in Paris and Washington will be productive of further actions to reduce communist strength and influence. It is noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. European Command (USCINCEUR) to provide, insofar as is consistent with his primary responsibilities, full cooperation and all appropriate support to the U. S. Ambassadors to France and Italy in implementation of these plans, to include, if requested, appointment of a military officer to represent him on each of the advisory panels expected to be established in Paris and Rome. It is hoped that the Paris Committee will avail itself of military aid and assistance at its earliest opportunity, thus completing the arrangements for coordinating the implementation of PSB D-14c.

37. It is believed that, upon such arrangements having been completed, the present form of coordination will be adequate, namely, periodic written reviews and reports on the part of Paris and Washington and informal exchanges of views by both as opportunities arise. It is anticipated that informal coordination will be established between the Rome and Paris panels in the form of periodic exchanges of views whenever occasions permit.

B. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

38. This report be forwarded by the Director to the members of the Psychological Strategy Board to be noted;

39. That the committees in both Washington and Paris prepare or cause to be prepared detailed operational plans and measures for the purpose of accomplishing the objectives in the order of general priority indicated in this report for the first six months of 1953.

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

Page 16 of 25

Security InformationTOP SECRET

PSB D -14c/2

March 5, 1953

ANNEX AA. Actions by the French Government1. In the Trade Union Field

- a. So interpret or, if necessary, amend the law in order to limit trade union representation to those unions which are genuinely non-communist.

Comment: To amend the law in order to limit trade union representation solely to non-communist unions does not seem feasible as yet. Unless the government were able to show very convincing reasons for such a measure, it would appear to Labor and to a large strata of the public as an unnecessarily discriminatory and drastic measure and could not count on the support of the Socialists and MRP. If the Government's indictment of CGT Secretary General Le Leap can succeed in producing enough evidence of a sensational nature to brand the CGT as a tool for Soviet designs, then such a step could be taken. The Embassy will accordingly endeavor to encourage such action, if and when appropriate.

- b. Eliminate direct and indirect subsidy of the CGT as found in such special privilege situations as free rent for headquarters, reduced transportation charges, etc.
- c. Stop the indirect subsidy of communist trade union officials who are paid by both the national and local governments and by public and private industry.
- d. Eliminate communist control over plant committees, hiring halls, and curtail communists' rights to sit with various public and semi-public agencies.

Comment on b, c, and d: For some time now the French Government has been slowly and quietly eliminating various forms of subsidies to the CGT and its officials. By using the "artichoke-leaf" technique, various CGT offices have from time to time been required to leave public buildings, and payments to many communist trade union officials have been gradually stopped, especially in national industries. Steps are also being currently taken to try to eliminate communist control over plant committees, hiring halls, etc. The actions covered in b, c, and d are closely connected with the problem of eliminating communist trade-union representation, and therefore if this is dealt with, progress under b, c, and d would be accelerated.

- e. Support and assist the development and unification of the free trade union movement.

Comment: There are ways whereby the French Government can be of assistance to the free trade unions, and wherever possible the Embassy will continue to encourage such actions. However, it is difficult for the French Government--much less, a Right-wing government--to take an active role in trying to bring about the unification of free trade unions. Apart from the obstacle of the Church's interest in the maintenance of a solely Catholic union, the unions would resent any such interference by the Government in their affairs--much as the AFL and the CIO would oppose similar interference by the United States Government.

Security InformationTOP SECRET

87214

Security Information
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A
PSB D-14c/2

March 5, 1953

- f. Persuade employers in those plants where vigorous non-communist nuclei exist to stop dealing, negotiating and entering into collective bargaining agreements with communist unions, and to deal exclusively with non-communist unions.

Comment: For the past two years it has been the policy of organized industry to endeavor to deal, to the extent legally possible, solely with non-communist unions.

- g. Persuade employers to stop paying tribute to the Communist Party.

Comment: It is believed that in recent years there have been progressively fewer instances of employers paying tribute to the Communist Party than during the years immediately following the war. However, whether or not industrialists feel the need to take out reinsurance depends primarily on developments in the international scene and on the state of internal security in France.

2. In the Field of Government including Legislation and Administration.

- a. Accelerate the elimination of communist influence in government and autonomous agencies in the fields of defense, internal security, information, motion pictures, national education and national economy, and deprive communists of the use of municipal facilities.

Comment: Elimination of communist influence in the government and autonomous agencies in all fields is of primary importance. Much progress has been made, but there is still room for improvement. The technique used by the government until now has consisted of discreet and gradual removal of suspect officials from sensitive posts, supplemented by more drastic action when provocation arose. Steps were taken, for example, to cleanse the Atomic Energy Commissariat, although more could be done on the lower staff levels; suspect officers have been retired from active military service;

the Paris and Toulon police forces were recently cleaned up; and the Government has cracked down on local communist mayors where possible.

Stronger and more systematic action is in order and in fact being taken. The government's recent campaign against communist leadership as treasonable and Minister of Interior Brune's attacks on the Communist Party as "foreign" have laid a basis for more effective action along these lines than heretofore feasible against the Party, in view of the prevailing theory that it was just another French political party. We are reliably informed furthermore that extensive security checks are now being conducted throughout the French civil service to identify the political undesirables. Finally, on November 19, the Ministers of Justice and Interior presented to the Cabinet a bill providing for the removal from government posts of members of the Communist Party and front organizations. There is every indication, therefore,

Security Information
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A
 PSB D-14c/2
 March 5, 1953

that the government is now going forward with extensive measures aimed against communists in strategic posts, and that no encouragement on this score is needed.

In public affairs and cultural matters, some progress has been made, but this has been handicapped by deeply-rooted hostility to any government interference in these realms. Radio programs have lately been far more pro-American and anti-communist than heretofore--the recent Presidential elections in the United States, for example, were very thoroughly covered and favorably reported by French news broadcasts. In motion pictures, especially news reels, the situation has been less favorable, but there is also evidence of progress in this field. In the realm of national education, the same is true--two communist teachers were suspended on August 17, 1952. Nevertheless, in the face of widely-held suspicion towards government interference in cultural affairs, it is difficult to remove, without very good cause, pro-communist professors and teachers, many of whom had obtained their university and school posts immediately following the Liberation. It is not known whether the new bill to bar communists from holding government posts would apply to the radio, universities, etc., although there are indications that it may.

- b. Fully implement decree of September 30, 1950 calling for reorganization of the internal security system to cope with communist action in the event of emergency.

Comment: With regard to implementation of the September 30, 1950 decree calling for reorganization of the internal security system apparently no action has been taken as yet on creating a territorial guard, although the gendarmerie provisions including an increased number of units and assignment of auxiliary personnel for immediate mobilization have been largely completed. The Embassy will, therefore, encourage the full implementation of the decree as it seems appropriate and practicable within French budgetary limits.

- c. Amend the rules to reduce parliamentary immunity for extra-parliamentary communist activity.

Comment: To amend the rules of parliamentary immunity would require amendment of the Constitution, and it is doubtful that the Socialists and the MRP would support such a step at this time. In any case, consideration of this is premature until the Parliamentary Immunities Committee of the Assembly has rendered a decision on the government's request now pending for waiver of immunity on five communist deputies. If the waiver is granted, a precedent will have been established which should serve as an effective deterrent to the activities of the other communist parliamentarians in the future. Attention should also be drawn to the fact that the recent law requiring appointment of legally responsible co-directors to all newspapers whose directors are covered by parliamentary immunity has served to offset some of the advantages deriving to the communists from parliamentary immunity.

Security Information
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A
PSB D -14c/2
March 5, 1953

- d. Take action to preclude communists from administering social welfare benefits.

Comment: It is understood that a new Social Security bill is now under consideration that would do much towards preventing election of CGT officials to posts administering social welfare benefits and would provide stronger State control over expenditures by elected officials.

- e. Make further revisions in the electoral laws to diminish Communist Party representation in all levels of government.

Comment: The previous French Parliament made definite progress in revising the electoral law in order to reduce Communist Party representation in parliament. This was clearly demonstrated in the 1951 elections when, owing primarily to the workings of the electoral law, the Communist Party, despite receiving more votes (5 million total) than any other party, gained only 101 seats in Parliament--that is, less than the Socialist Party, for example, with 2.7 million votes and 106 seats. To attempt to reduce artificially communist representation further would risk meeting with considerable opposition at present. In any case, it is unlikely that further national elections will be held much before 1956.

- f. Strengthen and enforce legislation on defamation.

Comment: Existing legislation on defamation seems generally adequate and is now being enforced. Several instances have recently occurred where communist editors have been successfully prosecuted for libel.

- g. Accelerate selective deportation of foreign communists remaining in France.

Comment: The expulsion of 288 foreign communists in September of 1950 dealt effectively with the situation of the more dangerous foreign communists residing in France by removing most of such elements with paramilitary training.

- h. Develop harrassing action against French affiliates of international communist organizations and fronts.

Comment: The government has done much since May, 1952 towards harrassing the French affiliates of those international communist organizations and fronts (World Federation of Trade Unions, International Democratic Federation of Women, Federation of Democratic Youth, and World Peace Movement) whose headquarters in France it had dissolved in 1951. The Pinay Government had arrested top leaders of the communist youth front, the UJRF, as well as the CGT Secretary General, and it has conducted repeated searches of communist and leading communist front headquarters.

- i. Continue to control French communist and communist front mass demonstrations.

Security Information
TOP SECRET

Security Information
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A
PSB D -llc/2
March 5, 1953

Comment: There is every indication that the government intends to continue effective control of French communist and front mass demonstrations. The government's handling of the May riots and subsequent arrests gave striking emphasis to its intentions and capabilities in this field.

- j. Curtail availability to communists and communist-front press of newsprint and press equipment, controlled or subsidized by government agencies.

Comment: The government has already taken steps to handicap the communist press. Direct action to curtail the availability of newsprint to which the communist press has at present a legal right, would not seem feasible yet. An amendment of present legislation however might be envisaged in the event the current legal action against the Party leadership proves successful and creates a climate of opinion favorable to more discriminatory steps.

- k. Harass and restrict sale and distribution of Soviet and Cominform publications.

Comment: The government has prohibited the sale of leading Soviet periodicals and Cominform publications are no longer allowed to be distributed in France. However, action is still required against Paix et Democratie, a French Communist publication which reproduces most of the articles from the Cominform journal.

3. In the field of national defense.

- a. Strengthen and improve enforcement of existing legislation on military security and sabotage.

Comment: Progress has been made with regard to strengthening and enforcing legislation on military security and sabotage. Mention should be made in this connection of the State Security Law of March, 1950 which resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of such communist anti-militarist agitators as Henri Martin and Raymonde Dien among others, and the government's decree of July 11, 1952 making military security laws applicable to acts committed in France against NATO member nations.

- b. Continue and develop the use of shipping and port facilities for goods procured in dollar areas under MSA programs in a manner militating against communist strength by excluding as far as practicable:

- i. Communist union participation as such.
- ii. Employment of communists.
- iii. Accrual of other benefits to communists.

Security Information
TOP SECRET

Page 21 of 25

87214

Security Information
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A
PSB D -14c/2
March 5, 1953

Comment: Effective French Government control over the use of shipping and port facilities for goods procured in dollar areas is difficult in view of the fact that they are largely private shipments whose handling is determined mostly by economic considerations.

- c. Use, in a manner militating against communist strength, the potential available in:
- i. The French military program (location of installations, procurement, construction, and contracting for services).
 - ii. The French undertakings for construction and for provision for services under NATO infrastructure programs.

Comment: While military considerations are naturally paramount in governing French decisions with regard to their military program, the Embassy will encourage whenever possible the exploitation of this field to the communists' detriment.

Security Information
TOP SECRET

Page 22 of 25

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A
PSBID-14c/2
March 5, 1953

B. Actions by the United States Government

1. In the Trade Union Field

- a. Encourage and support programs to destroy communist control in French trade unions; support and assist the development and unification of the free trade-union movement through all available means.
- b. Comment: The Embassy will continue to assist wherever possible the free trade-unions. Much of the activity indicated properly comes within the bailiwick of the AFL and the CIO, and the representatives in France of both are energetic. However, French labor is presently so sharply divided and so sensitive to American interference in its affairs that action in this sphere comes very close to being counter-productive.
- b. As appropriate, create difficulties for French seamen who are members of communist unions to take shore leave in U. S. ports.

Comment: Creation of difficulties in U. S. ports for French seamen belonging to communist unions might only serve to strengthen pro-communist tendencies in many who at present belong to the communist unions solely for economic reasons and might also result in resentment in France, without actually inducing the seamen to abandon the communist unions or restricting the activities of genuine communist couriers.
- c. Influence the French Catholic Trade Unions to cease cooperating with the communist unions and unite with the other non-communist unions in France.

Comment: Comments made under paragraph a. above would also apply to the proposition of trying to influence the French Catholic trade unions to cease cooperating with communist unions and unite with the other non-communist unions. Moreover, the Catholic Church's natural diffidence to unification with Socialist unions is a factor not to be underestimated. It should, however, be stated in this connection that the non-communist unions generally cooperate with each other on most political issues; it is the necessity of having to be competitive with the communist unions on economic demands that often forces Catholic trade unions to cooperate with the communist unions.
- d. Discreetly promote and if necessary subsidize private campaign of gift packages (CARE type) to poorest elements of population.

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

Page 23 of 25

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A
PSB D-14c/2
March 5, 1953

Comment: MSA continues to subsidize the transport of gift packages to France, but promotion of gift campaigns no longer seems feasible--barring occasions of national disasters, such as floods, etc.,--owing to current budgetary limitations and growing American hostility to "hand-outs" to Europe and especially to France. However, sponsoring of local charity organizations and similar local activities on the part of American troops stationed in French towns, as envisaged under paragraph 3 b.i. (page 22) of PSB D-14/c, would be effective and is now being encouraged.

2. In the Political Field

Encourage deviationism within the French Communist Party and the CGT.

Comment: The French Government has reportedly given some discreet assistance to the national deviationist Independent Communist Movement.

Further information in this connection may be furnished by the CIA in Washington.

3. In the Field of Public Opinion

- a. Intensify discreet efforts to discredit communist-front and communist-dominated propaganda and political organizations.
- b. Work with anti-communist pressure groups, particularly those of youth, agriculture, labor, veterans, women and religion to build public support for France's military, economic and political position as a member of NATO and a unified Europe.

Comment on a. and b.: Both discrediting communist propaganda, communist and front organizations and the positive side of building up public support for France's position in NATO are absolutely essential and represent fertile fields which the Embassy will continue actively to exploit.

4. In the Field of Communist Income Sources

- a. Discredit French business firms which maintain illegal trade relations with the Soviet Bloc.

Comment: The Embassy will continue to report the names of French business firms known to be trading illegally with the Soviet Bloc, although it must be recognized that such trade in itself carries little stigma here.

- b. Identify and discredit communist-owned concerns which cater to American tourist trade.

Comment: The Embassy will endeavor to identify and discredit any communist-owned concerns which cater to American tourist trade, but no such concerns are known to the Embassy at present.

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

ANNEX A
PSB D-14c/2
March 5, 1953

5. In the field of National Defense

- a. Select where practicable sites for U. S. military installations in a manner which will (1) deprive communists of benefits thereof, provide these benefits to non-communist communities or organizations, thus encouraging desertions from the Communist Party, and (2) minimize the propaganda potential of the installations to the communists.
- b. As far as practicable regulate procurement of equipment, materials, and service (either by the U. S. service commands or in connection with MSA programs) and construction programs by the service commands, so as to eliminate, or minimize:
 - i. Communist union participation.
 - ii. Employment of communists.
 - iii. Accrual of other benefits to communists.
- c. As far as practicable influence selection of ports and port facilities for military-aid cargoes in such a manner as to discriminate against communist-dominated unions and areas and to strengthen the non-communists.
- d. As far as practicable program armed services activities such as fleet visits, so that in addition to the psychological purposes served, financial benefits to the local population accrue to non-communists.

Comment on a., b., c., and d.: In view of primary military considerations involved, it is doubtful that the selection of sites for installations, procurement and construction programs, selection of ports for military-aid cargoes, fleet visits, etc., can be based to any large extent upon the communist factor. However, the possible usefulness of decisions in this field in reducing communist influence shall be kept in mind.

- e. As necessary, continue U. S. demonstrations of Western strength of purpose and military capabilities, by fleet visits, aerial shows, etc.

Comment on e.: It is felt that U. S. demonstrations of strength would at present be counter-productive. On the other hand, the Embassy will continue to encourage demonstrations of French military strength.

SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET

Dropped
by OCB - by
proposal of 10/20/53

as

TOP SECRET

D-14

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000200120004-9

SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

| | | | |
|-----------------------|--|-----------------|--|
| DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION | | REGISTRY | |
| SOURCE | | CIA CONTROL NO. | |
| DOC. NO. | | | |
| DOC. DATE | | | |
| COPY NO. | | | |
| NUMBER OF PAGES | | | |
| NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS | | LOGGED BY | |

ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assistant Top Secret Control Officer who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the Top Secret document and the date of handling should be indicated in the right-hand columns.

| | | | |
|-------------|----------|----------|---------|
| REFERRED TO | RECEIVED | RELEASED | SEEN BY |
|-------------|----------|----------|---------|

25X1A

| | | | |
|---|--|-----------------------|-------------|
| <p>NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.</p> | | | |
| <p>THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:</p> | | <p>BY (Signature)</p> | |
| <p>DOWNGRADED <input type="checkbox"/></p> | | | |
| <p>DESTROYED <input type="checkbox"/></p> | | | |
| <p>DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO</p> | | <p>OFFICE</p> | <p>DATE</p> |

3-240

45-14293

5-151

Approved For Release 2003/03/26 : CIA-RDP00-01065A0002000420004-9

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80-01665A000200120001-9

SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

| DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION | | REGISTRY |
|----------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|
| SOURCE | <i>P.S.B.</i> | CIA CONTROL NO. <i>D7914</i> |
| Doc. No. | <i>PSB D 149/2</i> | DATE DOC. REC'D. |
| Doc. Date | <i>5 MAR 55</i> | LOGGED BY |
| Copy No. | <i>10</i> | |
| NO. of Pages | <i>267</i> | |
| NO. OF ATTACHMENTS | <i>TEMP</i> | |

ATTENTION: THIS FORM WILL BE ATTACHED TO EACH TOP SECRET DOCUMENT RECEIVED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OR CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET WITHIN THE CIA AND WILL REMAIN ATTACHED TO THE DOCUMENT UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT IS DOWNGRADED, DESTROYED OR TRANSMITTED OUTSIDE OF CIA. ACCESS TO TOP SECRET MATERIAL IS LIMITED TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOSE OFFICIAL DUTIES RELATE TO THE MATERIAL. EACH ALTERNATE OR ASSISTANT TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER WHO RECEIVES AND/OR RELEASES THE ATTACHED TOP SECRET MATERIAL WILL SIGN THIS FORM AND INDICATE PERIOD OF CUSTODY IN THE LEFT-HAND COLUMNS PROVIDED. THE NAME OF EACH INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS SEEN THE TOP SECRET DOCUMENT AND THE DATE OF HANDLING SHOULD BE INDICATED IN THE RIGHT-HAND COLUMNS.

[illegible]

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: WHEN THIS FORM IS DETACHED FROM TOP SECRET MATERIAL IT SHALL BE COMPLETED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACES BELOW AND TRANSMITTED TO CENTRAL TOP SECRET CONTROL FOR RECORD.

THE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:

DOWNGRADED

DESTROYED

DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO

BY (SIGNATURE)

OFFICE

DATE _____

TOP SECRET